

# SESIP Profile for PSA Certified™ ARoT-less Level 2



psacertified™



psacertified™  
level two

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Author PSA JSA Members:  
Applus+ Laboratories  
Arm Limited  
CAICT  
ECSEC Laboratory Inc  
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# 1 About this document

## 1.1 Current Status and Anticipated Changes

Current Status: 1.0 REL 01

## 1.2 Release Information

The change history table lists the changes that have been made to this document.

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<b>Date</b>	<b>Version</b>	<b>Confidentiality</b>	<b>Change</b>
2022-10-10	1.0 REL 01	Non-confidential	ARoT-less version derived from [SESIP-PP-L2], definition and alignment with [PSA-L1].

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## 1.3 References

This document refers to the following documents.

### 1.3.1 Normative references

Ref	Doc No	Author(s)	Title
[PSA-L1]	JSADEN001	JSA	PSA Certified Level 1 Questionnaire
[PSA-EM-L2]	JSADEN003	JSA	PSA Certified: Evaluation Methodology for PSA L2
[PSA-EM-L3]	JSADEN010	JSA	PSA Certified: Evaluation Methodology for PSA L3
[PSA-AM]	JSADEN004	JSA	PSA Certified Attack Methods
[PSA-PP-L2]	JSADEN002	JSA	PSA Certified Level 2 Lightweight Protection Profile
[PSA-PP-L3]	JSADEN009	JSA	PSA Certified Level 3 Lightweight Protection Profile
[SESIP-PP-L2]	JSADEN012	JSA	SESIP Profile for PSA Certified™ Level 2
[SESIP-PP-L3]	JSADEN011	JSA	SESIP Profile for PSA Certified™ Level 3
[PSA-L2-COMP]	JSADEN017	JSA	SESIP Profile for PSA Certified™ RoT Component Level 2
[PSA-L3-COMP]	JSADEN018	JSA	SESIP Profile for PSA Certified™ RoT Component Level 3
[SESIP]	GP_FST_070	GlobalPlatform	Security Evaluation Standard for IoT Platforms (SESIP) v1.1
[CEM]	CCMB-2017-04-004	Common Criteria	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology. Version 3.1, revision 5, April 2017.

### 1.3.2 Informative references

Ref	Doc No	Author(s)	Title
[GP-ROT]	GP_REQ_025	GlobalPlatform	Root of Trust Definitions and Requirements, Version 1.1, Public Release, June 2018
[PSA-SM]	ARM DEN 0079	Arm	Platform Security Model

## 1.4 Terms and Abbreviations

This document uses the following terms and abbreviations (see PSA-SM and PSA-L1).

<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
<b>Application</b>	Used in this SESIP profile to refer to the components which are out of the scope of the evaluation.
<b>Application Root of Trust Service(s)</b>	Application specific security service(s) that are not defined by PSA. Such services execute in the Secure Processing Environment and are required to be in Secure Partitions. This profile is only applicable for solutions that do not require any Application Root-of-Trust Services.
<b>Application Specific Software</b>	Software that provides the functionality required of the specific device. This software runs in the Non-Secure Processing Environment, making use of the System Software, Application RoT Services and PSA-RoT Services.
<b>Critical Security Parameter</b>	Secret information, with integrity and confidentiality requirements, used to maintain device security, such as authentication data (passwords, PIN, certificates), secret cryptographic keys, etc..
<b>Evaluation Laboratory</b>	Laboratory or facility that performs the technical review of questionnaires submitted for Level 1 PSA certification. The list of evaluation laboratories participating to PSA Certified can be found on <a href="http://www.psacertified.org">www.psacertified.org</a>
<b>Hardware Unique Key (HUK)</b>	Secret and unique to the device symmetric key that must not be accessible outside the PSA Root of Trust. It is a Critical Security Parameter.
<b>Host Platform</b>	The entity which when used in composition with a certified PSA Level 2 RoT Component [PSA-L2-COMP] or a certified PSA Level3 RoT Component [PSA-L3-COMP] form the scope of the certification covered in this profile.
<b>Initial Attestation Key (IAK)</b>	A PSA-RoT secret private key from an asymmetric key-pair used to sign attestation reports, thus ensuring that the report is bound to a unique PSA- RoT (and so device) instance.
<b>Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE)</b>	The processing environment that hosts the non-secure System Software and Application Specific Software. PSA requires the NSPE to be isolated from the SPE. Isolation between partitions within the NSPE is not required by PSA though is encouraged where supported.
<b>Partition</b>	The logical boundary of a software entity with intended interaction only via defined interfaces, but not necessarily isolated from software in other partitions. Note that both the NSPE and SPE may host partitions.
<b>Platform</b>	Used in this SESIP Profile to refer to the components which are in the scope of the evaluation.
<b>PSA</b>	Platform Security Architecture
<b>PSA Certification Body</b>	The entity that receives applications for PSA security certification, issues certificates, maintains the security certification scheme, and ensures consistency across all the evaluation laboratories.

<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
<b>PSA Functional APIs</b>	PSA defined Application Programming Interfaces on which security services can be built. APIs defined so far include Crypto, Secure Storage and Attestation.
<b>PSA Functional API Certification</b>	Functional certification confirms that the device implements the PSA Functional APIs correctly by passing the PSA Functional certification test suites.
<b>PSA Root of Trust (PSA-RoT)</b>	The PSA defined combination of the Immutable Platform Root of Trust and the Updateable Platform Root of Trust, and is considered to be the most trusted security component on the device. See [PSA-SM].
<b>Immutable Platform Root of Trust</b>	The minimal set of hardware, firmware and data of the PSA-RoT, which is inherently trusted because it cannot be modified following manufacture. There is no software at a deeper level that can verify that it is authentic and unmodified.
<b>Updateable Platform Root of Trust</b>	The firmware, software and data of the PSA-RoT that can be securely updated following manufacture.
<b>Platform Root of Trust Service(s)</b>	PSA defined security services for use by PSA-RoT, Application RoT Service(s) and by the NSPE. Executes in the Secure Processing Environment and may use Trusted Subsystems. This includes the services offered by the PSA Functional APIs.
<b>SESIP Profile</b>	Document providing a common set of functionality for similar products
<b>Secure Partition</b>	A Partition in the Secure Processing Environment.
<b>Secure Processing Environment Partition Management</b>	Management of the execution of software in Secure Partitions. Typical implementations will provide scheduling and inter partition communication mechanisms. Implementations may also enforce isolation between the managed Secure Partitions.
<b>Secure Processing Environment (SPE)</b>	The processing environment that hosts the PSA-RoT, and the PSA-RoT Services.
<b>Secure Boot</b>	The process of verifying and validating the integrity and authenticity of updateable firmware and software components as a pre-requisite to their execution. This must apply to all the firmware and software in the SPE. It should also apply to the first NSPE image loaded, which may extend the NSPE secure boot chain further.
<b>Security Target (ST)</b>	Document providing an implementation-dependant statement of security of a specific identified platform.
<b>System Software</b>	NSPE software that may comprise an Operating System or some run-time executive, together with any middleware, standard stacks and libraries, chip specific device drivers, etc., but not the application specific software.
<b>TOE</b>	Target of Evaluation. In this SESIP Profile it is a synonym for Platform.
<b>Trusted subsystem</b>	A security subsystem that the PSA-RoT relies on for protection of its assets, or that implement some of its services.

## 1.5 PSA Certified Level 2

PSA defines a common hardware and software security platform, providing a generic security foundation and allowing secure products and features to be developed on top of this platform.

The PSA Certified scheme involves the evaluation by a laboratory of a device against a set of security requirements and, in case of a successful evaluation, the certification by the PSA Certified certification body of this Platform. The evaluation laboratory examines measures and processes to ensure that a functional Platform is not vulnerable to the identified threats to the levels defined in this document.

The PSA programme recognises that there will be different security requirements and different cost/security trade-offs for different applications and eco-systems. This is reflected in specifications by introducing a range of assurance levels.

Two evaluation paths are currently possible for a PSA Certified Level 2 product, either through the PSA Certified Level 2 Protection Profile [PSA-PP-L2] and associated evaluation methodology [PSA-EM-L2], or through a SESIP evaluation using this SESIP Profile defined in this document, which defines the scope and security requirements for the evaluation of a Platform implementing the PSA architecture.

### 1.5.1 PSA Certified Level 2 Ready Evaluation

The PSA Certified scheme allows for pre-certification evaluation of FPGA or development-based systems, which provide reference designs for ASIC or custom chip, but which may not be able to meet all security functions of this profile. In this case, only the claimed security functions are tested by the Evaluation Laboratory who issues the Evaluation Technical Report. No PSA Certified Level 2 certificate is generated for a Level 2 Ready evaluation, but the Developer can obtain the rights to use a specific “PSA Certified Level 2 Ready” logo and showcase its solution on [www.psacertified.org](http://www.psacertified.org).

Such a logo could be used to demonstrate, for example, the benefit of software security assurance offered from an evaluated FPGA based system for development of secure AROTs, RTOS or device while maximizing chances of passing PSA Certified Level 2 certification for future ASIC or custom chips based on the FPGA reference design.



### 1.5.2 PSA Certified Level 2+SE Certification

The PSA Certified scheme also considers a PSA Certified Level 2 certification where the product architecture, as illustrated in Figure 1, includes a trusted subsystem, typically an external Secure Element or an on-chip enclave.

The Developer can obtain the rights to use the specific “PSA Certified Level 2+SE” logo and showcase the solution on [www.psa-certified.org](http://www.psa-certified.org), when the trusted subsystem has been certified for the security functions listed below for protection against physical attacks to at least PSA Certified Level 3 RoT Component (see section 1.5.3), or SESIP3, or AVA\_VAN.3 (with Common Criteria).

- Verification of Platform Identity
- Secure Update of Platform
- Secure Initialization
- Cryptographic Operation
- Cryptographic Random Number Generation
- Cryptographic KeyStore
- Secure Communication Support
- Secure Communication Enforcement

Note that the Limited Physical Attacker Resistance SFR (section 4.4.7) is mandatory for this type of certification.

The L2+SE logo could be used to demonstrate, for example, the benefit of protection against hardware attacks for the most sensitive assets of the product.

### 1.5.3 PSA Certified RoT Component

The PSA Certified scheme allows for certification of RoT Components that address a subset of the security functions required by an implementation for a Level 2 certifiable PSA Root-of-Trust (RoT) in accordance with this protection profile.

In the PSA Security Model [PSA-SM] such parts of a root-of-trust are referred to as a Trusted Subsystem. A typical example is an IP block that will be used in a chip. The IP could address a few security functions, with the rest of the chip covering all other requirements. Another example is an external chip that addresses a subset of the security functions, which when connected to another chip (Host Platform) form a complete Level 2 certifiable PSA-Root-of-Trust.

A PSA L2 RoT Component [PSA-L2-COMP] may be used to aid the evaluation of an L2 PSA-RoT certification. A PSA L3 RoT Component [PSA-L3-COMP] may be used in composition for the evaluation of an L2 PSA-RoT certification and may be used to obtain a “PSA Certified L2+SE” certificate (see section 1.5.2).

## 2 Introduction

This SESIP profile covers the security functionality defined in the PSA L2 SESIP Protection Profile [PSA-PP-L2] but is applicable only to devices that do not support Application Roots of Trust (ARoT) services.

### Application Note

**If ARoT services are supported then the ST must claim compliance with [SESIP-PP-L2].**

PSA Certified Level 2 requires any ARoTs to be isolated from the PRoT. Supporting ARoT/PRoT isolation typically increases the code footprint and may reduce performance, neither of which may be acceptable on resource constrained devices. Where ARoTs are not required and all necessary security functionality is provided by the PRoT and PRoT Services, then an ARoT-less certified device may be used.

**Devices certified under this protection profile can only be deployed where there is no need for any ARoTs.**

Except for matters relating to ARoTs, this protection profile is equivalent to [SESIP-PP-L2].

This protection profile is based on the SFRs (Security Functional Requirements) listed in the SESIP catalogue [SESIP]. This profile also includes some optional SFRs aiming to cover most of the platform use cases.

The effort for performing the AVA\_VAN.2 activities of a standard implementation of a PSA-RoT is **25 person-days**. It is assumed for this workload that:

- the source code for the components in scope of the platform (see Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, hardware design is not required). This shall include drivers for Trusted Subsystems if used.
- no additional SFRs are added in the Protection Profile.
- evaluation activities cannot be re-used.
- the SFRs “
- Cryptographic Operation” and “Cryptographic Key Generation” include one cryptographic algorithm.

#### Reading guide:

In the document there is guidance information aiming to facilitate reader understanding. This information can be easily identified as it is included in tables with a grey background:

*REQ*: guidance that must be considered and followed for the Security Target writing.

*INFO*: clarification to be considered.

### 2.1 SESIP Profile Reference

Reference	Value
PP Name	SESIP Profile for ARoT-less PSA Certified Level 2
PP Version	V1.0 REL 01
Assurance Claim	SESIP Assurance Level 2 (SESIP 2)
Optional and additional SFRs	<TBD>

**Table 1: SESIP Profile Reference**

## 2.2 Platform Reference

The platform is uniquely identified by its chip (hardware) reference and its PSA defined Root of Trust (software) reference as described below. The developer declares that only the evaluated and successfully certified products identify in this way.

Reference	Value	
Platform Name	<TBD>	
Platform Version	<TBD>	
Platform Identification	Chip name and version	
	PSA-RoT name and version	
Platform Type	<TBD>	
Trusted Subsystem Identification	<If a trusted subsystem is used, provide reference such as chip name, part number and version.>	
Trusted Sub-system Certification	<If the trusted subsystem is PSA RoT L2 or L3 Component certified, please state the level, and provide the Certificate EAN-13 reference or another identifier.>	

**Table 2: Platform Reference**

## 2.3 Included Guidance Documents

The following documents are included with the platform:

Reference	Name	Version
<[Ref1]>	<Full title of the document>	<Vx.y>

**Table 3: Guidance Documents**

**REQ** The guidance must list all the documents that will be provided to the evaluator for the documentation review, covering AGD\_OPE.1 and AGD\_PRE.1. This documentation is expected to be available to the customers without restrictions.

## 2.4 Platform Functional Overview and Description

### 2.4.1 Platform Type

<The developer must choose an appropriate Platform type.> Some examples are:

- Processor with internal hardware isolation, such as Arm TrustZone technology, and secure memory.
- Processor with multiple cores where one is dedicated to security.
- Processor with external trusted subsystem, such as a Secure Element or secure storage device.
- Use of a separate security processor with secure memory.

<i>INFO</i>	As stated before, these are examples of different Platform types. The developer must fill this section based on the evaluated product.
<i>REQ</i>	<p>When a trusted subsystem is relied upon for operation of the PSA Root of Trust, such as an on-chip security subsystem or off-chip Secure Element, the developer must describe usage of the trusted subsystem, such as, cryptographic provider for the Platform Root-of-Trust.</p> <p>The developer may reference any existing security certification of the Trusted Subsystem, such as PSA Certified RoT Component, SESIP, FIPS-140, or Common Criteria. If any existing security certification is not sufficient to cover the trusted subsystem security functions relied upon to establish the PSA Root of Trust, the developer can pre-certify these security functions by either:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- a PSA Certified Level 2 RoT Component certification [PSA-L2-COMP]</li><li>- a PSA Certified Level 3 RoT Component certification [PSA-L3-COMP]</li></ul> <p>Otherwise, these security functions will be evaluated within the scope of the PSA Certified Level 2 security evaluation.</p>

Note that secure memory may be integral to the die, on a separate die within the same package or on an external package cryptographically bound to the main chip.

### 2.4.2 Physical Scope

The hardware is a <System-on-Chip or a System-in-Package or a discrete solution all with board level integration>.

The hardware is in the scope of the security evaluation as it provides security features, such as immutable storage or protection of JTAG, which are essential for ensuring the security of the implementation.

<write specific scope details, which may be a silicon chip, a PCB, ...>

### 2.4.3 Logical Scope

The scope for a SESIP Security evaluation, or Target of Evaluation (TOE), according to this profile is the combination of the trusted hardware and firmware components implementing a PSA-RoT with the Security Functional Requirements stated in this document, see Figure 1.

The Chip security evaluation scope includes the following Secure Processing Environment PSA-RoT elements, as described in [PSA-SM]:

- Immutable Platform Root of Trust, for example, the Boot ROM, any root parameters, the NSPE/SPE isolation hardware, and any hardware based security lifecycle management and enforcement.
- Updateable Platform Root of Trust, for example, a main bootloader, the code that implements the SPE Partition Management function, the code that implements the PSA defined services such as attestation, secure storage, and cryptography.
- Any Trusted subsystems that the host processor relies on for protection of its assets, or that implement some of its services.

The Platform scope hardware may be a System-on-Chip or a System-in-Package, possibly supported by board level trusted subsystem components, for example, a Secure Element or Subscriber Identification Module.




Figure 1: Scope of PSA Certified Level 2 ARoT-less

<complete this section with the logical scope of the evaluated product>

#### 2.4.4 Usage and Major Security Features

This profile considers the following features for the purpose of PSA Level 2 security evaluation:

- A Secure Processing Environment (SPE) isolated by hardware mechanisms to protect critical services and related assets from the Non-Secure Processing Environment.
- A Secure Boot process to verify integrity and authenticity of executable code in a chain of trust starting from the Boot ROM. Related certificates are protected in integrity by hardware mechanisms.
- Support for Secure Storage, to protect in integrity and confidentiality sensitive assets for the SPE and related applications. These assets include at least the Hardware Unique Key (HUK), the PSA-RoT Public Key (ROTPK), the Initial Attestation Key (IAK), and the unique instance ID.
- A Security Lifecycle for the SPE, to protect the lifecycle state for the device and enforce the transition rules between states.
- Cryptographic functions services for SPE and SPE applications.
- Support for an attestation method, for example Entity Attestation Token (according to IETF specification).

*<complete this section with the additional information from the evaluated product>*

#### 2.4.5 Required Hardware/Software/Firmware

*<clarify if the platform is supplied with existing apps, Application Root of Trust Services or other components. If any Application Root of Trust Services are provided, then this is the incorrect protection profile and use must instead be made of [SESIP-PP-L2].>*

### 3 Security Objectives for the operational environment

For the platform to fulfil its security requirements, the operational environment (technical or procedural) must fulfil the following objectives.

ID	Description	Reference
KEY_MANAGEMENT	Cryptographic keys and certificates outside of the platform are subject to secure key management procedures.	<[Ref1]> Section X
TRUSTED_USERS	Actors in charge of platform management, for instance for signature of firmware update, are trusted.	<[Ref1]> Section X
UNIQUE_ID	The integrity and uniqueness of the unique identification of the platform must be provided by the platform user during the personalization stage.	<[Ref1]> Section X
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>

**Table 4: Security Objectives for the Operational Environment**

<i>INFO</i>	Additional Objectives for the Environment may be added.
<i>REQ</i>	The guidance must list all the documents that will be provided to the evaluator for the documentation review, covering AGD_OPE.1 and AGD_PRE.1. This documentation must be available to the customers.
<i>REQ</i>	The integrity and uniqueness of the unique identification of the platform should be supported by the development, production, and test environment.  Otherwise, if the integrity and uniqueness of the unique identification is responsibility of the Platform user, then the objective for the environment UNIQUE_ID must be defined.

# 4 Security Requirements and Implementation

## 4.1 Security Assurance Requirements

The claimed assurance requirements package is **SESIP2** as described in Section 5.1.

### 4.1.1 Flaw Reporting Procedure (ALC\_FLR.2)

In accordance with the requirement for a flaw reporting procedure (ALC\_FLR.2), including a process to report flaw and generate any needed update and distribute it, the developer has defined the following procedure:

*<Describe the procedure, including where flaws can be reported (website and/or email address), how the reported flaws are handled in a timely manner, and how an application developer/end-user is informed of the update.>*

## 4.2 Base PP Security Functional Requirements

As a base, the platform fulfils the following security functional requirements:

- REQ** The “Verification of Platform Identity” and the “Secure Update of Platform” requirements are explicitly listed here, because they are mandatory in all SESIP Security Targets. Additional SFRs are then added to suit the vendor objectives.
- REQ** For every SFR, a description of the implementation in the platform needs to be included.

### 4.2.1 Verification of Platform Identity

The platform provides a unique identification of the platform, including all its parts and their versions.

- INFO** This requirement is mandatory according to [SESIP].
- REQ** When a trusted subsystem is used for this function, the Chip Vendor must describe how the trusted subsystem is identified.

### 4.2.2 Verification of Platform Instance Identity

The platform provides a unique identification of that specific instantiation of the platform, including all its parts and their versions.

### 4.2.3 Attestation of Platform Genuineness

The platform provides an attestation of the “Verification of Platform Identity” and “Verification of Platform Instance Identity”, in a way that ensures that the platform cannot be cloned or changed without detection.

- REQ** When a trusted subsystem is used for this function, the Chip Vendor must describe how attestation is performed and which information is exchanged with the trusted subsystem.



#### 4.2.4 Secure Initialization of Platform

The platform ensures its authenticity and integrity during platform initialization. If the platform authenticity or integrity cannot be ensured, the platform will go to **a state where no other operation except optionally Secure Update of Platform can be performed.**

<i>INFO</i>	Secure initialization must include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Updateable Root of Trust, including any Trusted Sub-system(s)</li><li>- Application Root of Trust (if any)</li></ul>
<i>REQ</i>	If the initialization fails, restarts or at most recovery using the update mechanism may be performed. All other functions must not be available. The application may be used to facilitate this update but must not provide any other functionality until the authenticity and integrity of the platform is reestablished. Any guidance for the application on this must be explicitly mentioned as a Security Objectives for the operational environment, with explicit reference to where this guidance is provided.

#### 4.2.5 Attestation of Platform State

The platform provides an attestation of the state of the platform, such that it can be determined that the platform is in a known state.

#### 4.2.6 Secure Update of Platform

The platform can be updated to a newer version in the field such that the integrity, authenticity, and confidentiality of the platform is maintained.

<i>INFO</i>	PSA-RoT consists of an Immutable Platform RoT and an Updateable Platform RoT. This SFR is only applicable to the updatable parts.
<i>REQ</i>	The user guidance shall describe the secure anti-rollback policies that are enforced by the PSA-RoT. A device must only install software updates of newer versions than the current version on the device.
<i>REQ</i>	If parts of the Platform, for example a Host Platform and a Trusted Subsystem can be updated independently, then this SFR must be iterated to describe each process.

#### 4.2.7 Software Attacker Resistance: Isolation of Platform (between SPE and NSPE)

The platform provides isolation between the application and itself, such that an attacker able to run code as an application on the platform cannot compromise the other functional requirements.

<i>INFO</i>	This requirement must be interpreted as an isolation between SPE and NSPE.
-------------	--

#### 4.2.8 Software Attacker Resistance: Isolation of Platform (between PSA-RoT and Application Root of Trust Services)

<i>INFO</i>	This SFR is not applicable in this protection profile.
<i>REQ</i>	If this SFR is met, then the product must be certified using [SESIP-PP-L2].

#### 4.2.9 Cryptographic Operation

The platform provides the application with **Operations in Table 5** functionality with **algorithms in Table 5** as specified in **specifications in Table 5** for key lengths **described in Table 5** and modes **described in Table 5**.

Algorithm	Operations	Specification	Key lengths	Modes
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>

**Table 5: Cryptographic Operations**

REQ	This SFR addresses the algorithms available to the NSPE. As this SFR is mandatory, at least one cryptographic algorithm must be included in the scope.
REQ	The platform implements some internal functionality that performs cryptographic operations: secure storage, attestation, and boot decryption. The cryptography used by these functions must be also described in this SFR.
REQ	PSA requires equivalence of at least 128-bit security level.
REQ	When a trusted subsystem is used for some or all of this function, the Chip Vendor must describe which set of cryptographic operations is performed by the trusted subsystem.

#### 4.2.10 Cryptographic Random Number Generation

The platform provides the application with a way based on *<list of entropy sources>* to generate random numbers to as specified in *<specification>*.

INFO	This SFR addresses the RNG functionality available to the NSPE.
REQ	When a trusted subsystem is used for some, or all, of this function, the Chip Vendor must describe which part of the random number generation is performed by the trusted subsystem.
REQ	If the platform contains multiple random number generators, this SFR must be iterated to describe each instance.

#### 4.2.11 Cryptographic Key Generation

The platform provides the application with a way to generate cryptographic keys for use in **cryptographic operations in Table 6** as specified in **specifications in Table 6** for key lengths **described in Table 6**.

ID	Algorithm	Specification	Key lengths
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>
<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>	<TBD>

**Table 6: Cryptographic Key Generation**

REQ	This SFR addresses the key generation algorithms available to the NSPE. As this SFR is mandatory, at least one key generation algorithm must be included in the scope.
REQ	PSA requires equivalence of at least 128-bit security.
REQ	When a trusted subsystem is used for some, or all, of this function, the Chip Vendor must describe which set of cryptographic operations is performed by the trusted subsystem.

#### 4.2.12 Cryptographic KeyStore

The platform provides the application with a way to store *<list of assets, such as cryptographic keys and passwords>* such that not even the application can compromise the *<selection: authenticity, integrity, confidentiality>* of this data. This data can be used for the cryptographic operations *<list of operations>*.

REQ	This SFR addresses all the cryptographic key storage functionality available to the NSPE. As this SFR is mandatory, at least one cryptographic algorithm must be included in the scope.
REQ	The cryptographic keys used internally by the platform must be also described in this SFR, including the HUK, ROTPK, IAK secure storage key and boot decryption key (if supported)..
REQ	PSA requires equivalence of at least 128-bit security.
REQ	When a trusted subsystem is used for some, or all, of this function, the Chip Vendor must describe which cryptographic keys are stored on the trusted subsystem.

### 4.3 Additional Security Functional Requirements

*<Complete this section with the additional SFRs defined in [SESIP].>*

#### 4.3.1 Secure Communication Support

The platform provides the application with one or more secure communication channel(s).

The secure communication channel authenticates *<list of endpoints>* and protects against *<list of attacks including disclosure, modification, replay, erasure>* of messages between the endpoints, using *<list of protocols and measures>*.

INFO	If the platform provides multiple different secure channels, thus SFR should be iterated for each channel type.
INFO	This SFR is not applicable to any communication between a Trusted Subsystem and the Host Platform as these are internal to the platform.

#### 4.3.2 Secure Communication Enforcement

The platform ensures that the application can only communicate with *trusted subsystems* over the secure communication channel(s) supported by the platform using *<list of protocols and measures>*.

INFO	The ST must include an iteration of Secure Communication Support for each secure channel type referenced in this SFR.
INFO	This SFR is not applicable to any communication between a Trusted Subsystem and the Host Platform as these are internal to the platform.

## 4.4 Optional Security Functional Requirements

### 4.4.1 Audit Log Generation and Storage

The platform generates and maintains an audit log of *<list of significant security events>* and allows access and analysis of these logs following a specific *<access control policy>*.

**INFO** The developer can choose whether to implement this functionality and claim the SFR or not to implement it and not claim the SFR.

### 4.4.2 Software Attacker Resistance: Isolation of Application Parts (between each of the Application Root of Trust services)

**INFO** This SFR is not applicable in this protection profile.

**REQ** If this SFR is met, then the product must be certified using [SESIP-PP-L2].

### 4.4.3 Secure Debugging

The platform only provides *<list of endpoints>* authenticated as specified in *<specification>* with debug functionality.

The platform ensures that all data stored by the application, with the exception of *<list of exceptions>*, is made unavailable.

**REQ** If the platform implements secure debugging, this SFR must be included in the ST as it addresses the authenticated access to the PSA-RoT debug functionality. However, in case that debug features are deactivated prior to the final product is delivered to the end-user, this SFR can be removed.

#### 4.4.4 Secure Encrypted Storage (internal storage)

The platform ensures that all data stored by the application, except for *<list of data stored in plaintext>*, is encrypted as specified in *<specification>* with a platform instance unique key of key length *<key length>*.

**REQ** Secure storage functionality may be covered by the following SFRs:

- 
- Secure Encrypted Storage (internal storage)
- Secure Storage (internal storage)
- 
- Secure External Storage

It is mandatory to define at least one SFR covering the secure storage functionality.

**REQ** Secure encrypted storage requires confidentiality and integrity.

**REQ** Data stored must be bound to the unique instance of the platform.

**INFO** This SFR covers the encrypted internal storage functionality available to the NSPE.

**REQ** The scope is all data stored in any memory included in the scope of the evaluation.

When a trusted subsystem is used for some, or all, of this function, the Chip Vendor must describe which set of assets is managed by the trusted subsystem.

In case that the data is stored in a memory which is out of the scope of the evaluation, the SFR “Secure External Storage” must be also claimed.

#### 4.4.5 Secure Storage (internal storage)

The platform ensures that all data stored by the application, except for *<list of data stored in plaintext>*, is protected to ensure its authenticity and integrity as specified in *<specification>* with a platform instance unique key of key length *<key length>*.

**REQ** Secure storage functionality may be covered by the following SFRs:

- 
- Secure Encrypted Storage (internal storage)
- Secure Storage (internal storage)
- 
- Secure External Storage

It is mandatory to define at least one SFR covering the secure storage functionality.

**INFO** This SFR covers the internal storage functionality available to the NSPE implementing authenticity and integrity (confidentiality not required).

**INFO** The scope is all data stored in any memory included in the scope of the evaluation.

In case that the data is stored in a memory which is out of the scope of the evaluation, the SFR “Secure External Storage” must be also claimed.

#### 4.4.6 Secure External Storage

The platform ensures that all data stored outside the direct control of the platform, except for *<list of data stored outside the direct control of the platform>*, is protected such that the **authenticity, integrity, confidentiality** *<and binding to the platform instance, versioning>* is ensured.

<b>REQ</b>	Secure storage functionality may be covered by the following SFRs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>-</li><li>- Secure Encrypted Storage (internal storage)</li><li>- Secure Storage (internal storage)</li><li>-</li><li>- Secure External Storage</li></ul> It is mandatory to define at least one SFR covering the secure storage functionality.
<b>INFO</b>	This SFR must be claimed if the platform data is stored in an external memory out of the scope of the evaluation.
<b>INFO</b>	If the platform relies on data stored in Secure External Storage, it is likely that Secure Encrypted Storage or Secure Storage will be necessary to implement the protection of the stored data.

#### 4.4.7 Limited Physical Attacker Resistance

The platform detects or prevents attacks by an attacker with physical access before the attacker compromises Verification of Platform Identity, Secure Update of Platform, Secure Initialization and *<list of Security Functional Requirements>*.

<b>INFO</b>	A Trusted Subsystem used in the implementation of a PSA-RoT is an example of a PSA certifiable RoT Component.
<b>INFO</b>	A Trusted Subsystem may comprise both hardware and software elements.
<b>REQ</b>	This SFR is mandatory for all certification to Level 2 + SE.
<b>REQ</b>	The developer must describe the mechanism that is used to protect in confidentiality and integrity the communication between the Trusted Subsystem and the Host Platform.
<b>REQ</b>	Level 2 + SE requires the link to be protected to prevent attacks such as probing to reveal secrets. Typically, this means use of cryptography where the link is easily accessible, for example, on a PCB trace or a physical pin of a device. An on-chip Trusted Subsystem must be shown to be accessible only by the SPE, this may be achieved by use of cryptography or by physical means.
<b>REQ</b>	The list of SFRs protected must include all functions performed on the Trusted Subsystem

# 5 Mapping and Sufficiency Rationales

## 5.1 Assurance

The assurance activities defined in [PSA-EM-L2] fulfil the SESIP2 activities. In particular, the required source code review, vulnerability analysis and testing to an equivalent of 25 person-days of the [PSA-EM-L2] is applicable.

*REQ* This section must be completed by the ST writer.

Assurance Class	Assurance Family	Covered by
ASE: Security Target evaluation	ASE_INT.1 ST Introduction	<Section "Introduction" and title page of the Security Target>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
	ASE_OBJ.1 Security requirements for the operational environment	<Section "Security Objectives for the Operational Environment" of the Security Target>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
	ASE_REQ.3 Listed Security requirements	<Section "Security Requirements and Implementation" of the Security Target>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
	ASE_TSS.1 TOE Summary Specification	<Section "Security Requirements and Implementation" of the Security Target>
<b>Rationale:</b>		
ADV: Development	ADV_FSP.4 Complete functional specification	<Description of which developer evidence is used to meet this requirement>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
AGD: Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1 Operational user guidance	<Description of which developer evidence is used to meet this requirement>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
	AGD_PRE.1 Preparative procedures	<Description of which developer evidence is used to meet this requirement>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
ALC: Life-cycle support	ALC_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures	<ALC_FLR section in the Security Target and description of which developer evidence is used to meet this requirement>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
ATE: Tests	ATE_IND.1 Independent testing: conformance	<Description of which developer evidence is used to meet this requirement>
	<b>Rationale:</b>	
AVA: Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.2 Vulnerability analysis	Vulnerability and testing carried out by the laboratory
	<b>Rationale:</b>	

**Table 7: Assurance Mapping and Sufficiency Rationales**



## 5.2 Functionality

**REQ** The aim of this table is to detail the mapping between [PSA-PP-L2] and the SESIP requirements defined in the current document based on the platform implementation.

Please, consider the following points to fill the table:

- Additional SFRs (Section 4.3) are not included in this table. If the Platform claims additional SFRs, add them to the table along with an explanation.
- Optional SFRs (Section 4.4) are included in this table. Any that are not claimed must be clearly indicated together with an explanation of why it is not claimed.
- To provide the mapping to F.SECURE\_STORAGE, select the appropriate secure storage SFR(s).
- This profile can be used for a wide range of functionalities. This is the case, for example, secure storage. Please, make sure that the mapping is consistent with the platform implementation.

<b>PSA Security Function</b>	<b>Covered by SESIP SFR</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
F.INITIALIZATION	Secure Initialization of Platform	Full coverage
F.SOFTWARE_ISOLATION	Software Attacker Resistance: Isolation of Platform (between SPE and NSPE)	Full coverage
F.SECURE_STORAGE	Secure Encrypted Storage (internal storage)	Requires encryption mechanism providing both integrity and confidentiality.
	Secure Storage (internal storage)	Requires authenticity and integrity
	Software Attacker Resistance: Isolation of Platform (between SPE and NSPE)	Stored data is isolated from the NSPE and Application Root of Trust Services by using a unique HUK for each platform.
	Not covered by any SESIP SFR. Note added in "Secure Encrypted Storage".	Covered by user guidance.
	Secure External Storage	Requires encryption mechanism providing authenticity, integrity and confidentiality.
F.FIRMWARE_UPDATE	Secure Update of Platform	Full coverage

PSA Security Function	Covered by SESIP SFR	Rationale
F.SECURE_STATE	Software Attacker Resistance: Isolation of Platform	Full coverage
	Partially covered by the SFR “Secure initialization of platform” and “Secure update of platform”.	Full coverage
	Limited Physical Attacker Resistance	Required for level 2 + SE, when SFRs are provided by a Trusted Subsystem.
F.CRYPTO	Cryptographic Operation	Additional algorithms can be added based on the supported algorithms provided by the PSA cryptographic API.
	Cryptographic KeyStore	Additional algorithms can be added based on the supported algorithms provided by the PSA cryptographic API.
	Cryptographic Random Number Generation	The evaluation of the random number generator shall follow a recognized methodology, e.g. [AIS31] or [SP800-90].
	Cryptographic Key Generation	Additional algorithms can be added based on the supported algorithms provided by the PSA cryptographic API.
F.ATTESTATION	Verification of Platform Identity	Unique identification of the platform
	Verification of Platform Instance Identity	Unique identification of the platform instance
	Attestation of Platform Genuineness	“Verification of Platform Instance” and “Verification of Platform Instance Identity” are included in the attestation token.
	Attestation of Platform State	Full coverage
F.AUDIT	Audit Log Generation and Storage	Full coverage
F.DEBUG	Secure Debugging	Full coverage if the debug functionality is available to the end user.

**Table 8: Functionality Mapping and Sufficiency Rationales**