PSA Certified™
Level 2 Lightweight Protection Profile

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Abstract

Platform Security Architecture defines a Root of Trust (PSA-RoT) that is the critical security trust anchor of a device, and on which its data and services depend. It is necessarily a combination of trusted hardware and trusted firmware (e.g. a port of Trusted Firmware-M). Because the PSA-RoT is the source of platform security it is important that it is independently evaluated to show that it can protect the PSA-RoT assets against defined threats.

PSA Certified Level 2 is a fixed time, test laboratory based, evaluation of the PSA-RoT. It is aimed at IoT devices that need to protect against scalable software attacks. The Level 2 documents include: a Protection Profile (PP) that describes the Target of Evaluation, its assets, the security objectives and security functions that will be evaluated; an Evaluation Methodology (EM) that details how the evaluation will be carried out, and an Attack Methods (AM) document describing the attacks in scope.

Developers submit their PSA-RoT to an approved test laboratory, listed on www.psacertified.org, for Level 2 evaluation and receive an Evaluation Technical Report. If the PSA-RoT is assessed as passing and approved by the independent Certification Body, a digital certificate will be issued on the PSA Certified website.

Keywords

PSA Certified, Level 2, Certification, IoT, Platform Security Architecture, PSA, Security, Protection Profile
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1 About this document

1.1 Current Status and Anticipated Changes
Current Status: Final

1.2 Release Information
The change history table lists the changes that have been made to this document.

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Version</th>
<th>Comments</th>
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<tr>
<td>25/09/2019</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>Initial version, approved by JSA members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01/12/2019</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>Clarifications</td>
</tr>
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1.3 References
This document refers to the following informative documents.

1.3.1 Normative references

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Ref</th>
<th>Doc No</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[PSA-AM]</td>
<td>JSADEN004</td>
<td>ARM JSA</td>
<td>PSA Certified: Attack Method</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PSA-EM]</td>
<td>JSADEN003</td>
<td>ARM JSA</td>
<td>PSA Certified: Evaluation Methodology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[PSA-LI]</td>
<td>JSADEN001</td>
<td>ARM JSA</td>
<td>PSA Certified: Level 1 Questionnaire</td>
</tr>
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</table>

1.3.2 Normative references

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Ref</th>
<th>Doc No</th>
<th>Author(s)</th>
<th>Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[PSA-SM]</td>
<td>ARM DEN 0079</td>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>PSA: Device Security Model</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 1.4 Terms and Abbreviations

This document uses the following terms and abbreviations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Application firmware</td>
<td>The code running in the NSPE that provides the main functionality of the device. Typically comprising a RTOS and one or more tasks. PSA provides no isolation services for this firmware, although the RTOS may make use of available hardware support to provide internal isolation of operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application Root of Trust</td>
<td>This is the security domain in which additional security services are implemented. See <em>PSA Security Model</em> [PSA-SM] for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Application Root of Trust Service</td>
<td>This is a Root of Trust Service within the Application Root of Trust domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTAG</td>
<td>Joint Test Action Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hardware Unique Key (HUK)</td>
<td>Secret and unique to the device – this symmetric key must not be accessible outside the PSA Root of Trust.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-secure Processing Environment (NSPE)</td>
<td>This is the security domain outside of the SPE, the Application domain, typically containing the application firmware and hardware.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Platform Security Architecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Certified Secretariat</td>
<td>Entity in charge of operating the PSA Certified scheme. It receives applications for PSA Security certification, issues certificates and updates the scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Functional APIs</td>
<td>Foundations from which security services are built, allowing devices to be secure by design. Three sets of APIs have been defined, so far, and include Crypto, Secure Storage and Attestation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Functional API Certification</td>
<td>Functional certification for a device that ensures that the device has implemented PSA Functional APIs and passed the PSA Functional certification Test Suites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Immutable Root of Trust</td>
<td>The hardware and code and data that cannot be modified following manufacturing. See <em>PSA Security Model</em> [PSA-SM] for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Root of Trust</td>
<td>This defines the most trusted security domain within a PSA system. See <em>PSA Security Model</em> [PSA-SM] for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Root of Trust Service</td>
<td>This is a Root of Trust Service within the PSA Root of Trust domain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA Updateable Root of Trust</td>
<td>The Root of Trust firmware that can be updated following manufacturing. See <em>PSA Security Model</em> [PSA-SM] for details.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Root of Trust (RoT)</td>
<td>This is the minimal set of software, hardware and data that is implicitly trusted in the platform – there is no software or hardware at a deeper level that can verify that the Root of Trust is authentic and unmodified. See <em>Root of Trust Definitions and Requirements</em> [GP-ROT].</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Root of Trust Service (RoT Service)
A set of related security operations that are implemented in a Secure Partition. The server endpoint of a PSA IPC channel. Multiple RoT Services can co-exist in a single Secure Partition.

### Secure Partition
A thread of execution with protected runtime state within the Secure Processing Environment. Container for the implementation of one or more RoT Services. Multiple Secure Partitions are allowed in a platform.

### Secure Processing Environment (SPE)
This is the security domain that includes the PSA Root of Trust and the Application Root of Trust domains.

### SiP
System in Package

### SoC
System on Chip

### SPE
Secure Processing Environment
A platform's processing environment for software that provides confidentiality and integrity for its runtime state from software and hardware outside of the SPE. Contains the Secure Partition Manager, the Secure Partitions and the trusted hardware.

### SPM
Secure Partition Manager. The part of a PSA implementation that is responsible for isolating software in partitions, managing the execution of software within partitions, and providing IPC between partitions.

### Trusted boot
Trusted Boot is technology to provide a chain of trust for all the components during boot.

### 1.5 Feedback
The PSA JSA Members welcome feedback on its documentation.

If you have comments on the content of this documentation, send an e-mail to psacertified@arm.com. Give:

- The title (PSA Certified Level 2 Lightweight Protection Profile).
- The number (JSADEN-002) and version.
- The page numbers to which your comments apply.
- The rule identifiers to which your comments apply, if applicable.
- A concise explanation of your comments.

PSA JSA Members also welcome general suggestions for additions and improvements.

**Note**

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2 Introduction

2.1 Document Context

PSA defines a common hardware and software security platform, providing a generic security foundation and allowing secure products and features to be developed on top of this platform.

The PSA Certified scheme involves the evaluation by a laboratory of a device against a set of security requirements and, in case of a successful evaluation, the certification by the PSA Certified secretariat of this TOE. The evaluation laboratory examines measures and processes to ensure that a functional TOE is not vulnerable to the identified threats to the levels defined in this document.

The PSA programme recognises that there will be different security requirements and different cost/security trade-offs for different applications and eco-systems. This is reflected in specifications by introducing a range of assurance levels.

2.2 Targeted Audience

This document is directly aimed at:

- Chip Vendors, who develop the chip and the PSA components for the Secure Processing Environment, e.g. integrating Trusted Firmware-M, and SPE Developers.
- Evaluation Laboratories, who perform Level 2 evaluations according to the security requirements set in this document.

It can also be used by OEMs who conceive and develop platforms based on PSA specification in order to assess the robustness level of the security functions they rely on and to develop applications or libraries on top of the platform.

2.3 How to Use this Document

This document defines three important aspects of a security evaluation:

1. The scope of the evaluation, i.e. the part of the device that will be subject to the evaluation and the context the device and TOE is intended to be used.
2. The security problem considered in this scope, i.e. the actual threats on the TOE in its operational context.
3. The required security functions in the TOE in order to mitigate the identified threats.

The Developer (Chip Vendor or SPE Developer) will find here a description of the security functions to be implemented in order to pass the evaluation and an explanation (the security problem) of why they are required. For the purpose of the evaluation, the Developer will have to derive from this lightweight Protection Profile a lightweight Security Target (ST) that with chip-specific information relevant for the Evaluation Laboratory. He is expected to directly reuse the contents of this document and fill parts in "<orange>".

SPE Developer can also apply for evaluation of their code, but they must choose a specific hardware implementation to perform the first evaluation.
The Evaluation Laboratory will use this document as a reference of the security functions required for a PSA-compliant device. For the purpose of the evaluation, he will mainly consider the chip-specific Security Target provided by the Chip Vendor and derived from this PP.

2.4 Process for PSA Certified Level 2

The process for certification of devices based on the PSA architecture according to PSA Certified Level 2 scheme involves the role of a PSA Certification Secretariat. It receives applications for PSA Security certification, issues certificates and updates PSA Certified scheme.

The process is:

1. The Chip Vendor designs and implements its chip and PSA root of trust implementation according to the security problem and security functions described in this document. He considers the Attack methods document [PSA-AM] to understand how its chip will be assessed by the Evaluation Laboratory.
2. The Chip Vendor submits its chip, which may already be integrated on a device, and related documentation to an Evaluation Laboratory.
3. The Evaluation Laboratory performs the security evaluation of the TOE according to PSA Certified Evaluation Methodology [PSA-EM]. The Evaluation Laboratory may ask clarifications from the Chip Vendor.
4. If the result of the review by the Evaluation Laboratory is Pass, the Evaluation Laboratory will provide a EAN-13 for the chip or device.
5. The PSA Certification Secretariat reviews the Evaluation Technical Report from the Evaluation Laboratory and proceeds to the certification of the TOE. The EAN-13 is published along with device or chip reference on the Secretariat’s website.

2.5 Resistance to Attacks

PSA certification is designed for IoT devices which will be deployed at scale. To meet PSA Certified Level 2 there shall be no attacks that can be remotely applied to a class of devices. It is not required to protect against physical attacks on an individual device, as it is assumed the attacker will not be able to repeat the attack on sufficient devices before being detected.

Therefore for the purposes of PSA Level 2 certification, attacks that require physical access for the exploitation phase are excluded. Physical attacks are only considered valid in the identification phase of the attack if they lead to scalable remote attacks (for example revealing a class key shared by all devices).
# 2.6 Product Identification

For its Security Target, the Chip Vendor shall fill this part with product-related information.

## 2.6.1 Contact

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Company name:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contact name:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact title:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact email:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact address:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contact phone:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

## 2.6.2 Chip Reference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commercial name:</th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAN-13:</td>
<td><em>(As used in the HW version claim of the chip attestation token)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW reference:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HW version:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE name:</td>
<td><em>(e.g. Trusted Firmware-M)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPE version:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference documentation:</td>
<td><em>(Provide identification of the reference documentation for the TOE and its trusted subsystems used to fill this document for producing a Security Target. It may be requested by the Evaluation Laboratory)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 2.6.3 Chip Description

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected usage:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Features:</td>
<td><em>(Describe the functional and security features marketed for the product)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Description of expected operational environment:</td>
<td><em>(Describe if any the actors and resources required for operation of the chip, and the related security assumptions)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2.6.4 PSA Implementation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSA functional API certified:</th>
<th>(Yes or No)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Isolation boundary level:</td>
<td>(For PSA Certified Level 2, may be isolation boundary level 2 or 3, as described in [PSA-FF])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA RoT services:</td>
<td>(Describe RoT services part of the PSA root of trust)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trusted subsystem:</td>
<td>(Describe trusted subsystems relied upon for operation of PSA root of trust, such as a security subsystem, Secure Element, and their usage, or declare 'none' if no trusted subsystem is used)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3 TOE Description

3.1 Scope

The scope for a PSA Level 2 Security evaluation, or Target of Evaluation (TOE), is the combination of the hardware and firmware components supporting a device compliant with PSA specification. The considered hardware may be a System-in-Package (SiP), a System-on-Chip (SoC) integrated on a board, or similar set-up.

The hardware is in the scope of the security evaluation as it provides security features, such as immutable storage or protection of JTAG, which are essential for ensuring the security of the PSA implementation.

The PSA platform components that are in the scope of the security evaluation, as described in [PSA-FF], are:

- PSA updateable root of trust, such as Software isolation framework, protecting more trusted software from less trusted software, Generic services such as binding, initial attestation, generic crypto services, FW update validation.
- PSA immutable root of trust, for example Boot ROM, Root secrets and IDs, Isolation hardware, Security lifecycle management and enforcement. This component cannot be updated.
- Trusted Subsystems used by the PSA root of trust, such as security subsystems, trusted peripherals, SIM or SE, which include both hardware and software components are also in the scope of evaluation.

For its Security Target, the Chip Vendor may provide the high-level HW and SW architecture of its product.
3.1.1 Major Security Features

The PP considers the following features for the purpose of PSA Level 2 security evaluation:

- A Secure Processing Environment (SPE) isolated by hardware mechanisms to protect critical services and related assets from the Non-Secure Processing Environment.
- A Secure Boot process to verify integrity and authenticity of executable code in a chain of trust starting from the Boot ROM. Related certificates are protected in integrity by hardware mechanisms.
- Support for Secure Storage, to protect in integrity and confidentiality sensitive assets for the SPE and related applications. These assets include at least the Hardware Unique Key (HUK), the ROT Public Key (ROTPK), the Attestation key.
- A Security Lifecycle for SPE, to protect the lifecycle state for the device and enforce the transition rules between states.
- Cryptographic functions services for SPE and SPE applications.
- Support for Entity Attestation Token (according to IETF specification).

3.1.2 Operational Environment

The TOE Operational Environment includes:

- other Applications Root of Trust or other Applications executed in the SPE environment
- alternate OS and applications executed in the Non-Secure Processing Environment (NSPE).
- remote entities (for instance remote servers, administrators, users), in charge of personalizing the TOE, managing firmware update or interacting with the TOE.

The Chip Vendor shall provide a clear description of the operational environment of the TOE for its expected usage.

3.2 Assumptions

The following assumptions hold on the operational environment of the TOE:

- Cryptographic keys and certificates outside of the TOE are subject to secure key management procedures.
- Actors in charge of TOE management, for instance for signature of firmware update, are trusted.
- Each TOE has a unique identifier, provisioned during manufacturing.
- Integrity of immutable code is ensured by hardware mechanism such as ROM, or EEPROM or FLASH memory that is locked before device delivery.

For its Security Target, the Chip Vendor may describe additional assumptions on the operational environment of the TOE. This should also be reflected in the user guidance documentation for the TOE.
4 Security Problem Definition

4.1 Assets
The TOE shall protect:
- The integrity of SPE updateable code.
- The integrity and confidentiality of root secrets: Initial Attestation Key (IAK), Hardware Unique Key (HUK) and, if supported, Boot encryption key.
- The integrity of root parameters: Instance ID and Boot validation key (ROTPK).
- The integrity of the lifecycle state

4.2 Threat Agents
The threat agents which may attack the TOE are remote hackers, with access to a remote connection to the TOE.
During the identification phase of the attack, it is assumed that threat agents can have remote and local physical access to the TOE for analysis purposes. By this attackers could identify vulnerabilities which can be remotely exploited to break any of the security functions of Section 5.

4.3 Threats
This section identifies threats on the TOE.

4.3.1 T.ROGUE_CODE
An attacker succeeds in loading and executing rogue code on the device in the Secure Processing Environment, and compromises the TOE assets.

4.3.2 T.FIRMWARE_ABUSE
An attacker exploits a flawed version of the PSA root of trust (including hardware), for instance by sending malformed parameters, and compromises the TOE assets.

4.3.3 T.UPDATE_ABUSE
An attacker exploits a flaw in the firmware update mechanisms of the TOE, for instance by sending malformed parameters, by altering an authentic firmware update, by installing an old version of the firmware or by bypassing security checks, and installs a flawed version of the PSA updateable root of trust.

4.3.4 T.STORAGE
An attacker succeeds in illegally modifying or accessing assets stored on the TOE, for instance by bypassing checks related to TOE lifecycle.

4.3.5 T.DEBUG
An attacker succeeds in accessing TOE debug features and illegally modifies or accesses TOE assets.
4.3.6 T.WEAK_CRYPTO
An attacker exploits flaws in the use or implementation of cryptographic algorithms in the TOE and illegally modifies or accesses TOE assets.

4.3.7 T.IMPERSONATION
An attacker manages to make remote entities recognize a rogue device under its control as a valid TOE.
5 Security Functions

In order to mitigate the identified threats, the TOE shall support the following security functions.

This part is similar to the Security Functional Requirements (SFR) part of a Common Criteria Protection Profile, although written in an informal style.

For its Security Target, the Chip Vendor shall provide additional information on how each of these security functions are implemented.

5.1 F.INITIALIZATION

The TOE is started through a secure initialization process that ensures the authenticity and integrity of the firmware.

This security function mitigates T.ROGUE_CODE by preventing the installation firmware or piece of firmware code from unknown sources.

5.2 F.SOFTWARE_ISOLATION

The TOE provides isolation between the Non-Secure Processing Environment and the Secure Processing Environment and also between PSA Root of Trust and other executable code (such as Application Root of Trust) of the Secure Processing Environment.

This corresponds to at least isolation level 2, as defined in PSA Firmware Framework [PSA-FF].

This security function mitigates Error! Reference source not found. by preventing software outside of the TOE from tampering with TOE assets.

5.3 F.SECURE_STORAGE

The TOE protects the confidentiality and integrity of assets in a secure storage. The secure storage is bound to the platform. Only the TOE can retrieve and modify assets from this secure storage.

This security function mitigates T.STORAGE by preventing direct and unprotected access to assets.

5.4 F.FIRMWARE_UPDATE

The TOE verifies the integrity and authenticity of the TOE update prior to performing the update.

The TOE also rejects attempts of firmware downgrade.

This security function mitigates T.UPDATE_ABUSE by preventing installation of firmware from unknown sources or installation of obsolete firmware.

5.5 F.SECURE_STATE

The TOE ensures the correct operation of its security functions. In particular, the TOE:

• Protects itself against abnormal situations caused by programmer errors or violation of good practices from code executed outside of the TOE, either from SPE or NSPE.
• Controls the access to its services by Applications and checks the validity of parameters of any operation requested from Applications
• Enters a secure state upon platform initialization error or software failure detection, without exposure of any sensitive data.

This security function mitigates T.FIRMWARE_ABUSE Error! Reference source not found. by preventing exploitation of abnormal situations.

5.6 F.CRYPTO

The TOE implements state-of-the-art cryptographic algorithms and key sizes for protection of TOE assets. Recommendations may come from national security agencies (such NIST for U.S., BSI for Germany, CESG for U.K., ANSSI for France) or from academia. Weak cryptographic algorithms or key sizes may be available for specific usages and with specific guidance, but they shall not reduce security of provided state-of-the-art cryptography.

This security function mitigates T.WEAK_CRYPTO by preventing exploitation of cryptographic weaknesses to target TOE assets.

The Chip Vendor shall provide cryptographic algorithms and key sizes in scope for the evaluation. He may provide additional information on how these security functions are implemented, for instance with support of cryptographic accelerators.

5.7 F.ATTESTATION

The TOE provides an attestation service which reports on the device identity, firmware measurements and runtime state of the device. The attestation can be verified by remote entities.

This security function mitigates T.IMPERSONATION by providing a cryptographic proof of identity.

The Chip Vendor may specify which other information is included in device attestation, such as firmware measurements and runtime state of the device as in [PSA-SM].

5.8 F.AUDIT

The TOE maintains log of all significant security events and allows access and analysis of these logs to authorized users only (such as TOE Admin).

This security function mitigates T.ROGUE_CODE, T.FIRMWARE_ABUSE, T.UPDATE_ABUSE, T.STORAGE, T.DEBUG and T.IMPERSONATION.

This security function is optional for resource-constrained devices. The Chip Vendor shall provide a rationale on why is it discarded.

5.9 F.DEBUG

The TOE restricts access to debug features by deactivation or access control mechanism with the same level of security assurance as other security functions of this PP.

This security function mitigates T.DEBUG by preventing unauthorized access to debug features.
6 Appendix A: Developer Evidences

The Developer (Chip Vendor or the SPE Developer) shall provide the following documentation to the Evaluation Laboratory:

- Security Target based on this Protection Profile.
  - Developer shall reuse the contents of the PP and fill parts in &lt;orange&gt; in its Security Target.
  - Developer documentation referenced in the Security Target shall also be provided.
- Functional specification and/or Operational guidance, explaining how to use functions and services provided by the TOE and describing all external interfaces or physical input or output of the TOE.
- Installation guidance, explaining how to prepare the TOE for operational phase, including how to personalize device prior use.
- Answers to PSA Certified Level 1 Questionnaire [PSA-L1] for the TOE (Chip Vendor Section).
- Test results for PSA Functional Certification or otherwise test results from Developer functional tests of TOE APIs, including TOE setup for these tests.

Additionally, the Developer shall provide:

- The TOE, in its manufactured and finalized state. In this state, it shall only permits configuration operations that support the required use cases and accesses to the security functions. The TOE debugging and testing features are disabled and secure boot is mandatory. The TOE may be updated if it has not been designed to be immutable.
- The source code for the components in scope of the TOE (see Section 3.1, hardware design is not required). This shall include drivers for Trusted Subsystems if used.
- The functional testing environment for TOE APIs.
- The TOE test equipment if they are specific or dedicated.
### 7 Appendix B: Reference Lifecycle

The TOE only provides the root of trust and that this must be integrated into a device that will include other components and functions not covered by the PSA certification. The TOE typical life-cycle is as follows.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| 1 & 2: Firmware / Software / Hardware design | The Chip Vendor is in charge of designing (part of) the processor(s) where the TOE firmware runs and designing (part of) the TOE hardware security resources.  
  
  The Chip Vendor designs the TOE ROM code and the secure portion of the device chipset. |
| 3: Chip manufacturing            | The Chip Vendor produces the chipset including the TOE.  
  
  At this point, the TOE must be fully testable to permit checking for manufacturing defects. The TOE is then configured in multiple steps by the Chip Vendor and the purchasing OEM through the programming of fuses (enables, sets or seeds the Hardware Unique Key). |
| 4: Software integration          | The OEM is responsible for the integration, validation and preparation of the software to load in the product that will include the RoT, any pre-installed Applications Root of Trust, and additional software required to use the product (e.g. NSPE, Client Applications). |
| 5: Device manufacturing          | The OEM is responsible for the device assembly, initialization, provisioning and any other operation on the TOE and device before delivery to the end user. |
| 6: Deployed / Secure Enabled      | The end user gets a device ready for use, including the TOE.  
  
  This state only permits configuration operations that support the required use cases and has access to the security functions. The TOE debugging and testing features are disabled and secure boot is mandatory.  
  
  The TOE may be updated if it has not been designed to be immutable. |
| 7: Return Material Authorization (RMA) | This is a terminal state used for devices that are returned to the manufacturer for failure analysis. When a device is put into the RMA state, it loses access to its secret keys and, with it, the ability to operate securely. |